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Ab s t r a c t
From an econom ics perspective, forest policy can be evaluated using an e± ciency criterion,
but also from a distributional p ersp ective. A n instrum ent that can com bine b oth - the
e± ciency and distributional cost-b ene¯t analysis - is presented. T he traditional social cost-
b ene¯t m atrix is extended w ith a m atrix show ing changes in the distribution of incom e in
the p opulation. A third m atrix is also included, com bining e± ciency and distributional
estim ators in an abbreviated social w elfare functions m anner. T he procedure is applied to
the Pol i sh program m e of a®orestati on of agri cul turall ands i n the 1990s. T he study ref ers
to a® orestation ¯nanced from national public funds on lands of b oth public and private
ow nership. T he results show im provem ents in b oth the incom e distribution and the social
w elfare due to the a® orestation program .
Re s u me n
Des deelcam po del a econom¶ ³a , la p o l¶³tica forestal puede ser evaluada utilizando criterios de
e¯ciencia,pero tam bi ¶ en desde una p ersp ectiva distributiva. E n este trabajo se presenta una
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1. Introducti on
As currently practiced, cost-bene¯t analysis (CBA) does not incorporate the
di®erences in the income distribution of the a®ected population. The unequal
distribution of income has at least two possible e®ects on CBA. One is the dif-
ferent impact on utility ofan additional unit ofincome ifit goes to an individual
with lower or higher wealth. The other is the change in people's utility derived
f r o mt h ek n o w l e d g eo ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o ne ® e c t st r i g g e r e db yt h ep r o j e c t
under scrutiny.
So far, most research has been focused on the former and the implementa-
tion of some distributional weights has been proposed (see Little and Mirless,
1969; McGuire and Garn, 1969; and Weisbrod, 1968, among others). However,
the later has been more neglected in the literature. Najera (2003) proposes to
extend the traditional e±ciency based CBA to a triple matrix system, the Ef-
¯ciency and Distributional Cost Bene¯t Analysis (EDCBA), in which both the
e±ciency and the distributive e®ects of a project are considered. Such a system
allows the social planner to analyze separately whether a project is e±cient in
the use of the resources and whether the project has any equity implications.
Also, the third matrix of the methodology allows for combining both results
into a single indicator, expressed in monetary units summarizing the results of
the social desirability of the project.
This paper shows the results of applying the EDCBA system to a®oresta-
tion programmes in Poland. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The
EDCBA methodology is brie°y presented in section 2; a description of the Pol-
ish a®orestation programmes is provided in section three, while the results and
their discussion are introduced in section four; ¯nally, section ¯ve concludes.
2. T he ED C B A M ethodol ogy
EDCBA providesanextensionoftheclassicalCBA, totakedistributionale®ects
into consideration. It implies a triple matrix system: the traditional CBA
matrix (e±ciency based), a distributional matrix (re°ecting changes in income
distribution), and an overall welfare matrix (integrating the previous two).
2. 1. B asi c A ssum pti ons
Consider a society which income X is distributed among its n individuals, such
that yi denotes the income of individual i and X =
P n
i=1yi.
A CBA can be applied to a project that a®ects the above society, with
k =1 ;2;;K variables and t =0 ;1;;T relevant periods (say years), being 0 the
present period. These variables can either be costs (which reduce income) or
bene¯ts (resulting in an increase ofincome), and alter the welfare ofindividuals.Tonati uh N ¶ ajera,A dam K aliszew skiand P ere R iera 47
When the income distribution is not in°uenced by the investment to be
evaluated, X is denoted X SQ; t re°ecting the status quo or do-nothi ng (no
proj ect) situation in period t,s u c ht h a tyi;S Q ;tdenotes the individual income
of person (or household) i in period t if the project is not undertaken. The
income distribution would be:
X SQ; t=( y1;S Q ;t;y2;S Q ;t;:::yn; SQ; t):
Let P i;j;t denote the change individual i will experiment in period t (compared
to her income without project) due to the e®ect of variable j in this period.
Therefore, the new income of individual i at the end of period t due to the
investment would be









2. 2.D i stri buti onalM easurem ent
T h ev a r i a t i o no nt h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 2 ) ,c o m p a r i n gt h ep r o j e c t
situation with the no project one, is what constitutes the Net Present Value
result of a cost-bene¯t matrix (when the °ow is appropriately discounted).
The distributional matrix proposed here is concerned with the changes on the
individual incomes re°ected in the right hand side of the equation. The usual
way to measure the income distribution changes, and thus the gain or loss of
equality, is by indices of inequality.
Once the appropriate inequality index has been chosen, it is calculated for
the income distribution of each period. In this way, the gain or loss of equality
due to the project investment in each period t c a nb ee x p r e s s e da st h ec h a n g e
in the inequality index from period t¡ 1t op e r i o dt. This di®erence is known in
the inequality literature as the redistributive e®ect (see Lambert, 1993, among
others). This measure constitutes an estimation of the \aggregated" gain or
loss in equality in the proposed distributional (DCBA) matrix.
In short notation, let ISQ; tdenote the index measuring the status quo in-
equality level of the income distribution at period t; Ij;t the inequality level of
the income distribution at period t originated by the income changes from vari-
able (or income source) j;a n dIt the level of the overall inequality distribution
index at that period ifthe investment is undertaken. Furthermore, the measure
of the redistributive e®ect (the gain or loss of equality) of the project at period
t will be denoted as
REPt =[ ( ISQ; t ¡ 1) ¡ It¡ 1) ¡ (ISQ; t¡ It)]¸ t (3)
Where ¸ t re°ects a discount factor for the distributional e®ect of the project at
period t.
If the sign of the correspondent REP is positive, it re°ects an overall gain
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This index (REPt) would be the evaluation measure ofthe inequality e®ects
of the investment. In this sense, when accumulated until the last relevant
period, T , it is the counterpart ofthe net present value (NPV) in the traditional
CBA.
2. 3. R el ati onshi p betw een Inequal i ty and E± ci ency M easures
Once the equity matrix is completed, a new matrix can be introduced, the
e±ciency and distributional cost bene¯t analysis (EDCBA) matrix, to combine
the results of e±ciency (CBA) and inequality (DCBA). This aggregation can
be based on the abbreviated (or reduced) social welfare functions (ASWF).
These functions (Lambert, 1990) combine an e±ciency value with an inequality
measure. In general,
º(x )=V (¹;I)
where º(x ) is the aggregated welfare measure, ¹ is the e±ciency value and I
the relevant inequality indicator. The e±ciency measure takes often the form of
mean income (or income per capita), and can be interpreted as a \social good",
whereas the inequality would be considered a \social bad". The function re°ects
the trade-o® society faces when willing to give up e±ciency for a gain in equity
(Sheshinski, 1972; Okun, 1975).
Several properties are usually demanded to an ASWF (see Dutta and Es-
teban, 1992; and Ruiz-Castillo, 1995). The component º(x ) has to be symmet-
rical, increasing, and allow for transfers; and V (¹;I) has to be increasing with
respect to the ¯rst argument and decreasing with respect to the second. This
implies that I has to be symmetrical and meet the principle of transfer, which
is the case for the Gini, Atkinson, and generalized entropy indices (Blackorby
and Donaldson, 1978; Lambert, 1993). Furthermore, an inequality index is said
to be consistent with a social evaluation function if for any two distributions
M and Y with the same mean, I(m ) ¸ I(y) , V (m ) · V (y) (Ruiz-Castillo,
1995; Salas, 1996). The inequality indices mentioned above meet this property
also.
The most common functional form of the ASWF is V (¹;I)=¹ (1¡ I). For
detail on this and other functional forms, see Sheshinski (1972), Blackorby and
Donaldson (1978), Shorrocks (1988), Salas (1996), Tomas and Villar (1993),
Lambert (1993), and Ruiz-Castillo (1995; 1998) among others. The result is
expressed in monetary units, and it can be interpreted as the weighted gain in
welfare when inequality is also taken into account. This could be interpreted
as a \corrected" NPV of the project.
Considering time, let WP t be the welfare level at period t,s u c ht h a tWP t =
X t(1 ¡ It), where X t is the income at period t.T h e w e l f a r e e ® e c t s o f a n
investment project re°ect the di®erences between the status quo situation (the
situation without the investment) and the welfare level reached by the project
investment. Let ¢WP t = WP t ¡ WP t¡ 1 be the welfare change from period
t ¡ 1t op e r i o dt,o r
¢WP t = X t(1 ¡ It) ¡ X t¡ 1(1 ¡ It¡ 1): (4)
Finally, a \corrected" IRR (Internal Rate of Return) can be estimated for the
yearly welfare variation (¢WP t). Its interpretation is similar to the usual IRRTonati uh N ¶ ajera,A dam K aliszew skiand P ere R iera 49
of the CBA, but would be \corrected" by the equity implications of the project
under consideration.
3 . F o re st P o licie s
A®orestation of abandoned and marginal agricultural lands as well as other
suitable lands has been a policy goal in Poland since 1918. It has been connected
to a relatively low share offorest lands in the country, amounting to only 23.1%
after the Great War, and 20.8% after the Second World War. A®orestation
e®orts in the period of 1947-1990 resulted in a substantial increase of forest
cover, i.e. by 1.2 million hectares, and up to 27.8% ofthe country's area (DGLP,
1997; GUS 2003).
Economic and social transformations ongoing in Poland after 1989, have
caused that signi¯cant amount of land used for agricultural purposes has been
left fallow. This process has widely occurred at a di®erent scale in many regions
of the country. In general, huge areas of public ¯elds, meadows and pastures
h a v eb e e na b a n d o n e di nn o r t h e r na n dw e s t e r nP o l a n d ,w h i l ei ns o u t h e r na n d
eastern part of the country the process covered mainly lands of private prop-
erty. Currently, the total area of marginal agricultural lands amounts to 3.3
million hectares, at which 1.5 million hectares are estimated to be suitable for
a®orestation, and thus a®orestation ofthose lands has become one ofthe major
goals of the agricultural and forest policies (Kwiecien and Zajac, 2002).
The current share of forests in Poland amounts to 28.6% of the total area
(2003), which is less than the average in the European Union. In 1995, the
Polish government adopted the National Program for Expanding of Forest
Cover (KPZL) (MOSZNiL, 1995), which is targeted at a®orestation of 700,000
hectares of marginal agricultural lands, both private and public ones, till the
year 2020. Ifthe programme was successfully implemented, the country's forest
cover should expand by 2%, to reach in 2020 some 30% of the total country's
area. Nevertheless, a®orestation of agricultural lands has been carried out -
with various intensities - incessantly since the end of the Second World War.
Since 1992 the way ofa®orestation ofabandoned agricultural lands, includ-
ing its ¯nancing, has been de¯ned in the Act on Forests (Dz.U. 1991.101.444).
The Act introduced a diverse system of ¯nancing and supporting a®orestation
e®orts on public and private lands. In general, public lands are being a®orested
by the State Forests National Forest Holding - a state, self-dependent economic
entity, having no legal personality and representing the State Treasury where
the management of assets is concerned, but acting on a self-¯nancing basis.
In that case a®orestation activities are fully ¯nanced by the State budget and
their extent is signi¯cantly dependent on the amount of money provided every
year for this purpose in the State budget. Since 1998 the State budget covers
also some costs of tending and protection of the newly established young tree
stands. The a®orestation is carried out on lands which were managed by the
former State Agricultural Holdings, closed down at the beginning of the 1990s.
A®orestation of private agricultural lands is a voluntary activity of land
owners and its extent depends on factors which may encourage private owners
to establish new forests. According to the Act on Forests, costs of a®orestation
ofprivate agricultural lands may be covered fully or in part by the State budget,
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spatial management plans. Apart from the ¯nancial support from the State
budget, a®orestation of private lands is also ¯nanced by the Regional Funds for
Environmental Protection and Water Management, utilizing ¯nancial means
received from penalties and fees for the use of the environment, and - since
1998 - also from the forest fund (an internal compensatory fund of the State
Forests Holding). However, in practice, the ¯nancial support covers only costs
ofseedlings production (carried out by the State Forests), which comprises some
1/3 of the total costs of a®orestation. The rest of the costs (soil preparation,
planting etc.) are covered by land owners in kind (Chrempinska, 2003; Zaleski,
2003).
A®orestation between 1992 and 1999 covered altogether 115,603 hectares
of marginal agricultural lands, including 40,850 hectares of private and 74,753
hectares of public lands. The estimated number of private land owners involved
in the Programme amounts to 48,100. A®orestation on public lands were ¯-
nanced from domestic funds, while private land owners were funded, apart from
the aforementioned sources, also by the European Union PHARE Fund, with
the sum of money amounting to about 18% of the total ¯nancial support.
Among the main tree species planted on public lands there were Scots pine
(Pi nuss yl v e s t r i sL. ,2 8 % ) ,o a k( Q uercus sp., 22%), birch (B etula pendul a L.,
14%) and alder (Al nus gl ut i nosa L. , 12%). On private lands the average share
of the major tree species was as follows: Scots pine (46%), birch (20%), oak
(8%) and larch (Lari x deci dua L. , 8%) (CILP, 2000; DGLP, 2002).
4. R esul ts
The EDCBA methodology was applied to the private and public lands pro-
grammes. The Gini index was used in the estimation of the redistributive
e®ects, because of its facility to be decomposed by income sources and its
widespread utilization as an inequality index. However, the Atkinson inequality
index and the Entropy index could also be employed.
4. 1. D i stri buti onalA ssum pti ons
The costs and bene¯ts considered were:
² initial private investment,
² land opportunity cost,
² thinning and cutting,
² speci¯c taxes cost,
² commercial wood products,
² commercial non-wood products (mushrooms, blueberries, game),
² subsidies received,
² transaction costs, and
² externalities (carbon sequestration).
As externalities, carbon sequestration was taken into account. Estimation of
quantity of carbon sequestrated and stored within forest ecosystems has been
done on the basis of simpli¯ed methodology presented by Picard et al . (2001)
with some modi¯cations in order to adapt it closely to Polish conditions (Micha-
lak, pers. comm. 2002; UN-ECE/FAO, 2000). The method is based on calcu-
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of carbon quantity stored in forest soils. The price of carbon used for calcula-
tions was derived from the Carbon Market Indicator, launched under the EU
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme - EU ETS, as of February 2004, which
amounted to 45.0 ½ =/ t C ,i . e .1 2 . 3½ =/ t C O 2 (Point Carbon, 2004).
Taxes and subsidies were explicitly considered because even though they
are \neutral" in traditional CBA, they might have a considerable impact in
distributional terms.
The variables a®ecting mainly forest owners were distributed according to
income distribution proportionally to their income. In other words, farmers'
income was taken as a proxy variable for forest owners' income.
For the distributional e®ects of the externalities, two cases were studied.
First, assuming that they bene¯ted all the population equally without regard of
their income (income elasticity = 0). Second, assuming that the bene¯t of the
externality is used proportionally to the income distribution (income elasticity
=1 ) .
Finally, the subsidies paid to the farmers were assumed to be domestic
funds. In other words, the sources of these funds were distributed among tax
payers accordingly to their income shares.
Only one rotation period was always considered, since the ¯nancial instru-
ment contemplated only ¯nancing 1990s a®orestation.
Detailed information on the funded measures may be found in the database
developed within the Evaluating Financing Forestry in Europe (EFFE) project
on the European Forest Institute web page (http://www.e¯.¯).
4. 2. P rogram m es'C om pari son
There are two main di®erences in the two programmes considered. In the ¯rst
place, the Private Lands Programme includes the analysis for 40,850 hectares
from 1992 to 1999, while the Public Lands Programme a®ected 74,753 hectares.
The second di®erence is given by thinning and cutting and protective measures.
Table 1 summarizes the di®erences.
Table 1. Di®erences in variables for the two programmes evaluated.
Private Lands Program Public Lands Program
Weeding, thinning From year 25 to 47 From year 1 to 47
and cutting From year 50 to 57 From year 50 to 57
From year 65 to 72 From year 65 to 72
From year 80 to 87 From year 80 to 87
From year 100 to 107 From year 100 to 107
Protective measure From year 2 to 10 From year 2 to 22
From year 15 to 22 From year 33 to 40
From year 60 to 67 From year 60 to 67
Source: A uthors' ow n estim ations.
The investment is of 7,020,000 ½ = for the Private Lands Programme and 54,
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4. 3. P ri vate Lands P rogram m e
The di®erent matrices for the traditional Cost-Bene¯t Analysis as well as for
the distributional analysis and the integrated EDCBA were developed. A 4%
discount rate was used for the calculations.
The Private Lands Programme resulted with an estimated Net Present
Value (NPV) of 74,457,403 ½ = (1,822.7 ½ =/ha), and an Internal Rate of Return
(IRR) of 14.37%.
With respect to the distributional e®ects, the analysis was undertaken for
two di®erent assumptions:
Externalities are distributed proportionally among the whole population
(unitary income elasticity).
Externalities are distributed equally among the whole population without
regard of their incomes (zero income elasticity).
Results are shown in Table 2. Distributional e®ects are positive under the
zero income elasticity assumption, whereas they are negative under the unitary
income elasticity assumption. This change in the sign of the results is given
by the importance of the externalities, being the largest bene¯t involved in the
study. The unitary income elasticity assumption implies that the Gini index of
t h ee x t e r n a l i t yd i s t r i b u t i o ni st h es a m et h a nt h ei n i t i a li n c o m ei n e q u a l i t yl e v e l
for Poland. As a result, income inequality is not reduced with the project, since
the largest bene¯t (externalities) is positively a®ecting the higher income level
individuals in a greater proportion than to lower income individuals.
Table 2. Distributional and E±ciency results for
the Private Lands Programme.
Unitary income elasticity Zero income elasticity
for net externalities for net externalities




Total Redistributive -0.0029% 0.0430%
E®ect (DCBA)
Total Welfare 50,597,839 ½ = 71,876,396 ½ =
Change (EDCBA)
IRR (E±ciency 10.521% 17.263%
and equity)
Source: A uthors' ow n estim ations.
As shown in Table 2, the combination of the distributional e®ects and the
e±ciency results (NPV) of the project results in a total welfare change of 71.2
million euro for the zero income elasticity case, and of 50.5 million for the
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Internal Rate of Return (17.26%) is higher for the zero income elasticity case
than the traditional e±ciency based IRR of 14.37%.
4. 4. P ubl i c Lands P rogram m e
The Public Lands Programme includes the e®ects of the a®orestation pro-
gramme for 74,753 hectares. This is 34,000 has more than for the Private Lands
Programme. This implies that the investment made by the State through the
State Forests Holding, as well as the subsidies received and the bene¯ts were
higher. However, the CBA results show that the NPV of the program is of
only 43,197,653 ½ = (577.8 ½ =/ha), with a 5.5% IRR. Table 3 shows the results
for this programme. The di®erence in the IRR of the public and private pro-
gramme result from the value of transaction costs, which amount to as much as
43% of the total costs of all forest operations (stands tending, thinning, cutting
etc.). In case of the Private Lands Programme transaction costs are estimated
to some 6% of the costs (since they include costs of private forest supervision
only). Moreover, within this programme a range of protective and silvicultural
measures taken is not as wide, as in case of the Public Lands Programme.
Table 3. Distributional and E±ciency results for
the Public Lands Programme.
Unitary income elasticity Zero income elasticity
for net externalities for net externalities




Total Redistributive -0.0257% 0.0585%
E®ect (DCBA)
Total Welfare 61,188,948 ½ = 100,216,310 ½ =
Change (EDCBA)
IRR (E±ciency 4.49% 9.02%
and equity)
Source: A uthors' ow n estim ations.
Results are consistent in the sense that the zero income elasticity assumption
gives the best results with a positive redistributive e®ect and a higher overall
welfare change.
Each monetary unit invested in the Private Lands Programme yields a
higher return than if invested in the Public Lands one. This is due mostly
to the higher transaction costs paid in the latter programme and wider range
of silvicultural and protective measures taken in public tree stands. On the
other hand, the Public Lands Programme has the highest positive redistributive
e®ect under both income elasticity assumptions. The main factor explaining
this result is the distribution of the private investment. This variable is zero in
the Public Lands Programme, since all the investment is realized by the State.5 4 In teg ra tin g e± cien cy a n d E q u a lity co n sid era tio n s in th e E v a lu a tio n o f P u b lic P o licies
5 .Co nc l us i o ns
E±ciency and equity e®ects of public projects evaluation have not been tra-
ditionally considered altogether. This paper introduces a methodology that
integrates both criteria into the process of public projects evaluation.
It is proposed to incorporate equity (or equality) e®ects of public projects
into the well known CBA methodology, by adding two matrices of a similar
structure in the analysis, the EDCBA.
The ¯rst of this triple matrix system is the e±ciency based typical CBA.
While the second and third matrices constitute innovations in the public pro-
jects evaluation.
The second matrix, the DCBA, ¯ts in the e®ects of the income distribu-
tion. It is expressed in terms of redistributive e®ects, which are decomposed by
income sources (or variables considered for the project under consideration).
The third matrix, labelled EDCBA, combines the results of the previous
CBA and DCBA matrices into a single indicator ofthe change in social welfare.
The objective of this matrix is to provide social planners with a single indicator
ofthe social desirability ofa project in which both e±ciency and equity concepts
are combined.
EDCBA makes explicit the social judgments behind equality values. This
allows for better understanding the results, their limitations and their implica-
tions.
An application to Polish a®orestation programmes was undertaken. The
two projects were evaluated using the three matrices of the methodology. In
pure e±ciency terms, the Private Lands Programme is socially more pro¯table
per investment unit than the Public Lands Programme, due to the higher trans-
action costs and wider range of protective and silvicultural measures taken of
the latter. Results showed that both projects (Private Lands and Public Lands
Programmes) increase social welfare when it is assumed that the net external-
ities bene¯ts are valued equally by all members of the society increasing the
IRR ofboth projects when it is corrected by the equity criteria. Ifit is assumed
that the externalities bene¯ts are valued according to the incomes ofindividuals
(unitary income elasticity) the projects are pro¯table from the e±ciency point
of view, but fail when the equity criterion is incorporated. This highlights the
importance of accounting for the distributional impacts of the costs and the
bene¯ts of projects.
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